



REVIEWING THE 2008 INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL UNDER PRIME MINISTER MODI AND PRESIDENT TRUMP

Dr. D. Chandramouli Reddy

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Sri Krishnadevaraya University, Anantapuramu, Andhra Pradesh.

Abstract

At the close of the second decade of the 21st century and under the leadership of PM Modi and President Trump, this article examines the Indo-American Nuclear Agreement from 2008. After ten years of the India-United States Nuclear Cooperation Agreement of 2008, India's nuclear stature stands elevated because of membership in the "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement." Most of these shifts can be traced to the more developed state of Indo-American ties under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and President Trump. In violation of the requirements of the "Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action," the United States Administration has recently decided to exclude India and China from the economic sanctions imposed on Iran (JCPOA). India is now the only third Asian country, after Japan and South Korea, to have such a status for technical collaboration with the United States of America. This status was bestowed upon India by the United States Administration in the form of the "Strategic Trade Associate (STA-I)" designation. "The United States of America" has already declared that India would be a "Major Defense Partner" in 2016. The United States of America and India have signed the "Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and the Communications, Compatibility, and Security Agreement (COMCASA)." The Indian government is hopeful that similar exemptions would be granted to India by the administration of President Trump regarding India's recently concluded S-400 Missiles Deal with Russia, valued at \$5.5 billion. As part of the general strategy of the United States toward the Indo-Pacific area, it would not come as a major surprise to anybody who follows the state of Indo-American ties to learn that India may sail over all of these impediments without a hitch. India recently announced the successful completion of its Nuclear Triad policy, which added another element to the ongoing discourse of strategic stability and sea deterrence in the region. These new developments have made "the relationship between India and the United States" an object of envy for regional players such as China and Pakistan. The article tracks the results of "the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement of 2008" after one decade of its implementation, and it does so against the background of these significant events. It examines the myriad of variables that contributed to such a major shift in policy toward India on the part of the United States. The article delves into the motivations behind India's decision to deepen its collaboration with the United States. It is possible to conclude that both nations have placed a great deal of weight on the multifaceted character of their relationship and have been quite successful in establishing continuity and reliance in their bilateral dealings.

Keywords: *Nuclear deterrence, Nuclear cooperation, Natural friendship, Strategic.*

Introduction

Since long ago, India has had a reputation for bringing up the discriminatory character of nuclear trade with other nations in both international and bilateral venues. It had been working against the function of Western-led export restriction regimes for dual-use technology, including the MTCR, the NSC Australia and London Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. "Throughout the decade of the 1980s and the decade of the 1990s, numerous export control regimes played a discriminating role, which negatively



impacted India's nuclear program. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the United States has exerted a significant amount of pressure on India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as to put an end to and reduce the scope of India's nuclear weapons programme.”^[1] After the nuclear explosions in May of 1998, India's situation worsened. Sanctions were placed on over five hundred public sector organizations (PSUs) and private enterprises in India that were involved with nuclear operations by “the United States of America” and its allies. The normalization of ties between India and the United States came about in 2000 due to “several initiatives taken by the NDA government, headed at the time by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.” The ice broke due to the conclusion of many negotiations between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott and the exchange of a VISION document “between India and the United States of America during President Bill Clinton's visit to India in the year 2000.” The visit was very beneficial in assisting both nations in clearing up misconceptions about a variety of bilateral, regional, and international concerns.^[2]

It was after the change of National Democratic (NDA) government both in 2004 and in 2005 that new leaders in countries, “Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of United Progressive Alliance Government (Junior) (UPA), and the US President George W. Bush added a new chapter in the history of the Indo-U.S. Deal relationship after the signing of Indo-U.S. Nuclear in the year 2005. During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the United States of America in 2008, the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal was subsequently formalized into a full-fledged Nuclear India-U.S.A “Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.”^[3] It was the first step toward opening up nuclear trade between India, “the United States of America,” and the rest of the globe. It was supposed to enable Indian companies to receive complete waivers from various export control regimes, which would have allowed them to buy nuclear reactors from any part of the world and obtain other essential technologies from various corners of the world, including “the United States of America. “Because of this civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that has been in place since 2008,” the Indo-American bilateral relationship has undergone a significant transformation. At the same time, both countries have achieved several other landmarks in the defense, space, energy, and infrastructure sector after seven decades of relationship.

Although “nuclear cooperation with the United States of America” did not materialize significantly during the time of “President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2009-2014), this was due to one or more pretexts for which both the United States and India shared some of the responsibility.” The larger blame was placed on India for having enacted "The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010," which dissuaded many potential nuclear reactor manufacturers from the United States, Russia, Japan, Canada, and France from making any larger investments in India. This Act was the primary reason India was held accountable for the larger blame. Because some of them were caught up in liquidation-related litigations and did not show much interest in selling nuclear reactors to India after opening up “nuclear commerce with the rest of the world,” some of the blame was made against United States companies like Westinghouse Corporation also.

After ten years of the India-United States of America Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement of 2008, India's nuclear prestige stands elevated in 2018 due to memberships in the MTCR, Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and NSG waiver. This is because of India's nuclear eminence (without membership).

It is possible to attribute the historical transformation in their bilateral relationships to the more matured and reinforced nature of Indo-U.S. relations in 2018, which can be attributed to the fact that the majority of the changes that took place took place because of the active cooperation “of the United States of



America. These shifts indicate a huge revolution in the bilateral ties between India and the United States.”

Even though “President Trump took office in 2017” and Prime Minister Modi in 2014, the positive trend in their bilateral relationship is still going strong and showing no signs of stopping. Despite several concerns, the United States Administration recently (i.e., in October and November 2018) concluded that India and China should not be subject to economic sanctions on Iran. This was the case notwithstanding the requirements of CAATSA and JCPOA. “India is just the third Asian country, after Japan and South Korea, to have such a status for technical collaboration with the United States of America. The United States Administration bestowed this status upon India and gave India the STA-I designation. The United States of America designated India as a Major Defense Partner in 2016. In addition, India and the United States of America have both signed the Communications, Compatibility, and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA).” The process of being stable and dependent on one another is still ongoing between them.

The Indian government is hopeful that the administration of President Trump will offer similar exemptions to India when it comes to India's S-400 Missiles Deal with Russia, which is valued at \$5.5 billion and will be finalized in October 2018. Observers of Indo-American ties would not be surprised to learn that India may sail over these impediments effortlessly as a part of wider US strategy toward the Indo-Pacific area. This would not be a great surprise. These new developments have made “the relationship between India and the United States” an object of envy for regional powers like China and Pakistan. India recently announced that it had completed its Nuclear Triad strategy, adding another facet to the continuing discussion of strategic stability and maritime deterrence in the area. The article tracks the pre and post-results “of the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement of 2008” after ten years, i.e., in 2018. This is done against the background of all of these significant events. It examines the myriad of variables that contributed to such a major shift in policy toward India on the part of the United States. The article delves into the motivations behind India's decision to deepen its collaboration with the United States.^[5]

The Indo-American Nuclear Deal was Signed on July 18, 2005

Because of the NNPA Act of 1979 in the United States, “nuclear cooperation between India and the United States of America was almost halted. Because India had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, nuclear cooperation with the United States of America had become almost impossible.” In 1993, India also chose not to join the “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),” which effectively ended any possibility of “nuclear cooperation with the United States” and its western allies. The nuclear explosion in India in May of 1998 added another layer of complication to the situation; ultimately resulting in “the United States and its allies” imposing sanctions on over five hundred public and private corporations. “The visit of former President Bill Clinton in 2000” came after several rounds of Singh-Talbot conversations had already taken place. “A statement on the signing of the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Deal was made during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's meeting with President George W. Bush during his visit to the United States in July 2005.” Both parties needed to complete several additional procedures before finalizing the transaction. “India and the United States” had previously initialed a new framework for military engagement, providing prospects in sectors such as technology transfer, Convention-production, and Research & Development, before the announcement “of the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal in 2005. During his trip to Washington, DC, on June 28, 2005, the then-Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the New Framework for the US-India Defense Partnership for the next ten years with his American counterpart Donald Rumsfeld.”^[6] The most important deal concerned the broadening of commerce in military goods. The agreement was intended to serve as a



means to improve the safety of both countries, fortify their strategic partnership, increase the amount of interaction between their respective armed forces, and foster a deeper level of mutual comprehension between their respective defense establishments. Therefore, the process of close collaboration with the United States had already started, and “the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the United States of America in the year 2005 and the signing of a nuclear agreement with the United States further reinforced their bilateral ties.”

“A Brief Overview of the Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Deal between the United States and India (July 18, 2005)”^[7]

President George W. Bush conveyed to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, following the text of the agreement, that the United States would:

- Make efforts toward establishing comprehensive civil nuclear energy cooperation with India so that it may realize its objectives of boosting nuclear power and ensuring energy security.
- Seek the consent of Congress to modify existing laws and regulations in the United States.
- Collaborate with friends and allies to modify international frameworks (NSG) to facilitate full civil nuclear energy cooperation and commerce with India. This should include, but should not be limited to, prompt consideration of fuel supply for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.
- Urge the organization's partners also to give prompt consideration to this proposal. India has communicated its desire to participate in ITER (the international experimental fusion reactor) and its enthusiasm for the project.”

It was conveyed to President Bush by “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.” In other words, India would be ready to assume “the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.”

The following items make up these obligations and practices:

- Identifying and gradually isolating “civilian nuclear facilities and programs from military nuclear facilities and programs, as well as filing a statement with the International Atomic Energy Agency detailing its civilian nuclear facilities (IAEA).”
- Choosing to voluntarily submit its civilian nuclear plants to the oversight of the IAEA;

July 2005 Nuclear Deal to the Nuclear Agreement of 2008^[8]

The procedure of nuclear cooperation on a long-term basis was not an especially straightforward one. On each side, several obstacles needed to be overcome. Following the announcement of the nuclear agreement, a significant amount of discussion took place in both nations. As soon as the contract was revealed, there were skeptics among Indians and Americans about its legitimacy. “Some members of the United States Congress saw the deal as a direct challenge to the majority of the non-proliferation establishment in Washington. Others were opposed to the agreement because it did not extract enough from India in the form of disclosing India's nuclear assets and in the form of suspending the Indian weapons program.” According to Stephen Cohen, a prominent American scholar on South Asia, many people in the United States would have liked to have seen India place limits on its nuclear program and declare it more proactive in cooperating with “the United States in halting the nuclear weapons programs of other states.” Stephen Cohen thinks that many people in the United States hold this viewpoint. Separating India's civilian nuclear plants from the country's strategic nuclear installations proved to be a challenging endeavor. However, India went ahead and finished its separation plan, which removed the obstacles that had been in the way of “the passage of the Hyde Act” by the United States



Congress. This, along with the subsequent enactment of the "Hyde Act 2006" and the "123 Agreement" in August of 2007, resulted in the modification of national US laws, which enabled "nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the final agreement during his trip to the United States in 2008." "The United States needed to change its domestic laws to comply with the terms of the nuclear cooperation agreement. These regulations were created in response to India's PNE in 1974. Such preferential treatment for a single country to build strategic partnerships does provide an opportunity for the United States to demand a degree of reciprocity and responsibility from India. The United States had also taken it upon itself to convince members of the nuclear supplier's group (NSG) to make India-specific exceptions to benefit India from civil nuclear technology. The United States was obligated to develop a policy that prevents India from making any qualitative or quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal because it was certain that the United States might have tried to ensure that India's nuclear weapons capability does not pose a threat to its interests directly anywhere in the region. It was certain that the United States might have tried to ensure that India's nuclear weapons capability did not threaten its interests directly anywhere in the region. Additionally, the United States looked at several avenues that would have placed Pakistan and Iran within the jurisdiction of the NPT and CTBT." The primary objective of India's collaboration with the United States was to ensure that a lack of uranium would not hamper the country's civilian nuclear program. The nation had to immediately start an intensive search for uranium mines and concentrate on constructing a "Three Stage Nuclear Programme" predicated on the thorium cycle. After a transaction or agreement was completed, importing foreign reactors required a drawn-out procedure that included bidding, regulatory difficulties, and building delays. India was tasked with ensuring that it does not become fully reliant on foreign players and wind up with enormous foreign currency costs over the long run. After much back and forth in both tribunals, the obstacles that stood in the way of finalizing the nuclear accord were removed.

It wasn't until after the passage of the "Hyde Act 2006" and the "123 Agreement of August 2007" that national US laws were changed to provide room for nuclear cooperation "between the United States and India. It is important to note that the 123 Agreement between the United States and India was not signed by the President of the United States of America until after the Congress of the United States approved the Hyde Act in 2008." The importance of the "123 Agreement" lies in the requirement "that any nuclear cooperation between the United States" and any other countries must comply with "Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954." This provision was added in 1954. As a result, the '123 Agreement' detailed the numerous conditions and other needs of "nuclear cooperation between the United States of America and India."

A Brief Overview of the Indo-American Civilian Nuclear Agreement from 2008

"The nuclear pact between India and the United States increased the number of people who feared that the agreement would harm India, undermine India's strategic autonomy, and compel India to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty secretly. The opposition to the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement was so significant, and its political repercussions were so severe that on July 22, 2008, left-leaning parties withdrew their support from the government headed by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). However, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) administration was able to stay in power thanks to the backing of another regional party known as the Samajwadi Janata Party and its choice to back the UPA government at the center. Back then, groups on the political left thought India and the United States would engage in expanded military cooperation."⁹¹ In the uneven global system dominated by "the United States, India" will be forced to accept a lesser place and would be improperly accommodated. Left parties were considering the "123 Agreement" within the context of "the United States" entangling



India in a complicated web of political, economic, and military linkages as a component of the strategic alliance. Because of the anxiety stoked by opposition parties and other factors, the LEMOA and CESMOA agreements for higher levels of defense and security cooperation could not be signed with “the United States of America” until the following ten years.

The Logistics and Service Agreement, which the government of “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh” wanted to finalize with the United States of America, is also known as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which is an agreement that the United States already has with several countries, the majority of which are NATO nations. It would have provided facilities for refueling and full access for all aircraft and ships belonging to “the United States. India ultimately signed the LEMOA and COMCASA Agreement” with the United States of America in 2016 and 2018, in an amended form, following a delay of many years. This occurred only after the entrance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi into power in 2014, after which there was a wait of several years.^[10] There is no doubt that the apprehensions of opposition parties proved to be correct later when it was pointed out by many scholars who saw the US hand in “India's vote against Iran and the delaying of the finalization of the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, as well as a host of other agreements leading to the purchase of US arms to the tune of \$ 10 billion during the period of 2008-2018.”

The 2008 Nuclear Deal between India and the United States Assisted India in Achieving Its Goals Regarding Energy Security

It has been projected for India to boost its output of nuclear energy by “7 to 20,000 MWe by the year 2020 and 63,000 MWe by the year 2032, according to the Department of Atomic Energy.” As of this day, India has a total installed capacity of 4,560.0 MWe for its nuclear power plants. “The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) reports that seven new nuclear reactors are now being built.” In Kundakulam, two reactors of a thousand megawatts each are being constructed (2 x 1000), and they went into service in 2014. According to the IDSA Task Force Report findings, India's total nuclear power output is projected to expand by a factor of eight by 2022, meeting about 10 percent of the country's need for electricity. In addition, by 2052, the amount of energy that can be extracted from atoms will have multiplied by 70, adding close to 26 percentage points to India's overall need for power.^[11] Therefore, “the dependence on nuclear energy to supply the electricity demands of the world's second fastest expanding economy (among major nations) is set to record quantum improvement. This is because the world's second-fastest-growing economy is the United States.” Nothing at all would have been doable if India and the rest of the world did not open up channels of nuclear trade with one another. For India, reaching such lofty goals in the nuclear industry would have been an unattainable pipe dream. The nuclear deal ended India's isolation in the realm of nuclear trade. It opened the door for the nation to enter into civil nuclear agreements to import reactors and fuel with countries such as France, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Australia, Canada, South Korea, and Namibia. India is also close to finalizing an agreement with Japan. The conclusion of “the 123 Agreement between India and the United States of America in 2008” and the requisite waiver from the IAEA and NSG made it much simpler for India to import a total of twelve 1000 MW Light Water Reactors from Russia, France, and the United States. In addition, it intended to construct 12 reactors of 700 MW each that were developed locally. It is anticipated that all of these imports will be able to sustain the development of around 25,000 MW of “nuclear power by the year 2020,” with the possibility of this number increasing to approximately 50,000 MW by the year 2030. India can acquire uranium from other countries and strengthen its quest for uranium on its soil, with recent results recorded in Meghalaya and Andhra Pradesh states. If its capability in enriched uranium reactors is considerable, it may investigate the possibility of participating in the uranium enrichment process.



Naturally, in the meanwhile, it is anticipated that India will energetically pursue the fast breeder reactor program and start thorium use as soon as it is both practically and economically feasible to do so. India's nuclear power equipment manufacturing base is highly established for heavy water reactors and is also being built for fast breeder reactors. This is true for both types of reactors. Indian industry can begin manufacturing equipment for the LWRs that the country may acquire from Russia, France, "the United States," or other countries. As a result of changes in India's internal regulations, there has been an increase in the engagement of the private sector. Over the next few years, India will be in a position to export a complete heavy water reactor power plant. When the world is searching for non-carbon energy sources, there will be a significant opportunity for Indian enterprises and Indian technical personnel to serve a revived global nuclear sector. At the same time, India has been pursuing conversations to achieve the aim of a "world free of nuclear weapons." The "visit to the United States that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made on September 26-27, 2013, was intended to result in the construction of six nuclear reactors in the Indian state of Gujarat" by companies based in the United States, thereby bringing an end to the delay in the operationalization of the nuclear deal that had been caused by certain concerns regarding India's Nuclear Liability Act of 2010.^[12]

Following the signing of "the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement" and the subsequent creation of the Modi administration in India by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, many multinational companies have begun investing in India. For example, the Russian company "Atomstroy has committed to constructing six light water pressurized reactors at Kundakulam by 2017 and four in Haripur after that year. Areva, a corporation based in France, and NPCIL, a firm based in India, have signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on the construction of six European Pressurized Reactors (EPR). GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy has inked agreements to develop a multi-unit power plant with NPCIL and Bharat Heavy Electricals (BHEL), both of which will be responsible for constructing the 1350 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWR). In addition to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. and Korean Electric Power Co., many other corporations have also signed similar agreements with India on maintaining India's current PHWRs."^[13] Recent Advancements in the Indian Nuclear Industry (Post-IAEA & NSG Waiver).

As a result of "the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreement that was reached in September 2008, there is now the potential for the delivery of reactors and fuel from suppliers located in other nations. Agreements for civil nuclear cooperation have been struck with several countries, including the United States of America, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada, as well as Argentina, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Namibia. The Russian PWR types were not part of India's three-stage strategy for nuclear power; rather, they were merely intended to enhance the country's production capacity more quickly. At this time, there are plans to construct eight 1000 MWe units at the Kudankulam site. In January 2007, a memorandum of understanding was signed with Russia to construct four additional units at this location and those located elsewhere in India. It is anticipated that other buildings will bring the overall gross capacity up to 21,180 MWe between 2010 and 2020."^[14] The capacity goal for nuclear power plants is an element of the larger national energy strategy. "Areva of France, GE-Hitachi, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation" of the United States were the three primary reactor suppliers that NPCIL spoke with and had technical conversations with about the provision of reactors for these projects, as well as additional units at Kaiga. According to NPCIL, "India is now focused on capacity development via indigenization," meaning that imported designs would include gradually larger levels of indigenous content, up to 80%. Looking even further into the future, their expansion plan included the building of "25-30 light water reactors with at least 1000 MWe each by the year 2030."



Parks for Nuclear Energy Production

In keeping with previous practices, such as those used “at the eight-unit nuclear plant in Rajasthan, NPCIL plans to establish five additional "Nuclear Energy Parks." Each of these "Nuclear Energy Parks" will have the capacity to house up to eight new-generation reactors with a capacity of 10,000 MWe, six reactors with a capacity of 1,600 MWe, or simply 10,000 MWe in a single location. By 2032,” these five would have supplied between 40 and 45 GWe. The following will make up the future energy parks: Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu is getting an additional three pairs of Russian VVER units, bringing the total capacity up to 9200 M We. Jaitapur in Maharashtra: Preliminary construction will begin shortly “with six of Areva's EPR reactors” in mind, creating a total of 9,600 MWe. The first four of these nuclear power plants have received environmental permission. The following projects have received environmental clearance: “Mithi Virdf (or Chayamithi Viridi) in Gujarat, which is intended to host US technology (probably Westinghouse API 000); Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh, which is intended to host US technology (possibly GE Hitachi ESBWR). Haripur in west Bengal: to host four further Russian VVER-1200 units, making 4800 MWe.; Kumharia in Fatehabad District of Haryana is earmarked for four indigenous 700 MWe PHWR units, and the AEC had approved the state's proposal for a 2800 MWe nuclear power plant; Bargi in Madhya Pradesh is also designated for two indigenous 700 MWe PHWR units.” GE Hitachi says that it is in the process of signing a contract. NPCIL has begun pre-project activity at all previously stated locations, including new work. There are proposals to construct a PWR plant with a capacity of up to 6000 MWe at the Markandi (Pati Sonapur) location in Odisha.^[15] Additionally, the AEC has brought up the possibility of additional nuclear power stations being constructed in the states of Bihar and Jharkhand. After the Fukushima nuclear power plant catastrophe, many people have raised major worries over the dependency on nuclear energy and associated safety considerations. Despite this, the Indian government continues to advance its civilian nuclear program. The intervention of “the Supreme Court of India” was required to put a stop to the 13 demonstrations that were taking place at the Kudankulam nuclear power facility in the state of Tamilnadu.

Consolidating Ongoing Indo-U.S. Defense Cooperation: the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement.

Since the United States began its military involvement in Afghanistan in 2001, Indo-American ties have flourished and grown into what can today be described as a strategic alliance. An important aspect of this relationship is the realm of defense cooperation, which has resulted in the sale of high-tech guns and other military equipment to the Indian armed forces by many administrations of the United States. The most recent transaction comes on the heels of a previous announcement made by the Indian cabinet in June of this year. That statement approved India's largest-ever purchase from the United States and included ten C-17 heavy-lift aircraft with a total value of \$4.1 billion. The American weapons industry has found that they have made significant profits off the Indian defense sector for several years. In March of 2009, less than a year after “the signing of the nuclear deal in 2008 with India, the government of the United States gave its approval for the sale of eight Boeing P-81 long-range maritime patrol aircraft to the Indian Navy for a total of \$2.1 billion. Before that, in January of 2008, the White House approved the sale of six Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules military transport aircraft for one billion dollars.”

Similarly, the Indian Navy spent \$48 million in 2007 to acquire the USS Trenton, a military vessel formerly owned by the United States Navy. As was mentioned earlier, just before “the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in 2005, India and the United States” had already signed a historic defense framework that, for the first time, included joint production of arms. This agreement came just before the signing of “the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.” In a previous transaction in 2002, the United States government sold 12 weapon-locating radars produced by Raytheon to India for the sum of \$200 million. Things are set to change



around the beginning of 2015, as US corporations are expected to take advantage of new standards under 'Make in India,' which are being implemented by the administration of PM Modi. The inability of American businesses to sell a significant number of nuclear reactors to India before 2018 was compensated for by the success of American defense suppliers in securing contracts for increased sales of defense goods to India. Even though Russia and Israel are still India's two primary sources of military hardware, India may expect an increase in the number of weapons it purchases from the United States in the years to come. Because of its tight defense connections with China over the last several decades, Russia has not been finding favor with India for the sale of defense equipment, which can be claimed with absolute certainty here. Despite this, the Modi government finalized an agreement with Russia to acquire S-400 missiles during Putin's visit to India in October 2018. In this regard, it is also anticipated that the United States of America would exclude India from some sections of CAASTA.

Since 2018, the United States of America and India has been through a paradigm change due to the United States conferral of STA-I Status upon India for exporting high-technology items to India. It is vital to note that India is just the third nation in Asia to earn such a status with India after Japan and South Korea. This is a significant accomplishment for India. The government of the United States is committed to expanding its co-development and co-production of defense programs with India. Another illustration of the growing level of cooperation between Washington and New Delhi is the recent announcement made by the United States Defense Security Co-operation Agency (DSCA) regarding India's intention to purchase 32 lightweight MK-54 torpedoes manufactured in the United States as part of a transaction worth \$86 million USD. The two countries' strategic objectives have been more aligned in recent years, which have contributed to the flourishing of ties between the two nations and are reflected in the agreement.

Therefore, the upswing in Indo-American ties is continuing unabated under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and President Trump. All of these occurrences point to the fact that India has, so far, been able to avoid being affected by some of the protectionist and punitive policies connected to trade that have been implemented by the United States under President Trump's 'America First agenda. Trade between the United States and India on an annual basis hit a record high of up to \$126 billion in 2017, despite the ongoing trade war that is taking place “between the United States and China, as well as many other countries.” In addition, estimates suggest that the amount of money exchanged “between the United States and India” might reach as high as \$500 billion annually over the next four to five years. As a result, “the United States of America” maintains its position as India's top major trade partner.

Cooperation between India and the United States in the Indo-Pacific Region: The Role of China

The dynamics of the relationship “between India, the United States, and China have been molded in large part by factors such as nuclear order, energy security, and the global balance of power, amongst other factors. Some experts believe that strained relations between the United States and China would make India the pivotal power in the triangle formed by the United States, China, and India; however, tense relations between the United States and China would put the United States in a pivotal position. This highlights the important roles that the United States, China, and India will play in the new configuration of the balance of power. These worries have taken on a new shape and significance as a direct result of China's expansionist policies in the Yellow sea, East China sea, and South China sea regions.” Important nations in the area have been obliged to cooperate more closely to prevent China from being successful in achieving its goals on a long-term basis as a result of China's efforts to deny sea access policy to other countries. China has also been making frantic efforts to establish itself as a



genuine participant in the Indian Ocean Region, which has caused several nations in that region, particularly India, to experience increased security concerns.

The United States has recently signaled a significant change in the geographic emphasis of its defense strategy, which was published publicly. The company has decided to focus more on Asia, particularly the Pacific. According to a study conducted by a think tank in “the United States,” ought to formulate a strategy that is designed to make the use of force by the Chinese more expensive and to curb Chinese assertiveness, even if this comes at the expense of regional stability and American interests.^[16] The notion of making a "pivot" toward Asia is being strongly pursued by the administration of President Trump, who took office after the administration of President Obama. President Trump has imposed tariffs between \$50 billion to \$60 billion in different phases on imports of Chinese goods into the United States. China has also reacted by imposing tariffs on a broad range of items from “the United States. President Trump believes that the United States has a trade imbalance with China of \$500 billion per year” and that China steals intellectual property worth another \$300 billion. When engaging with Japan and “the United States” on China, India will need to exercise extreme caution. India has to continue to exercise extreme caution so that it does not pursue any aggressive policies towards China in this vein. But at the same time, as it should be pursuing a military deterrence strategy against China, it must maintain a policy of political détente with China. As previously mentioned the United States wants to encourage India to open up and actively participate with other QUAD members and prepare it to assume responsibilities beyond its territory, if possible, “in the Indo-Pacific region alongside Japan, South Korea, and Australia. On the other hand, India is aware that it is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is headed by Russia and China (SCO).”^[17]

“The fact that Indian Prime Minister Modi has been to the United States of America and Japan” on separate occasions hints only in this direction. The concept of multilateralism is one that India firmly supports. As a result, it should not be hindered in any way in its efforts to preserve positive ties with Russia and China. In recent years, India has preferred working closely with Russia. This preference can be explained by Russia's stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis and the crisis in Syria. Russia's position forced the United States of America to change its decision regarding Syria and Iran by giving diplomacy one more chance. India has critical interests in Iran and Afghanistan, some of which have not always coincided with those of the United States. However, “the United States is aware of the complexity of India's national security.” As a result, it exempted India from the CAASTA and JCPOA restrictions while simultaneously imposing sanctions on Iran and Russia. Despite the United States sanctions on Iran, India is still permitted to purchase crude oil from Iran. India anticipates a similar waiver from the United States over procuring S-400 Missiles from Russia. India continues to collaborate with Russia and China on matters about Iran and Afghanistan, as well as global concerns such as WTO reforms, issues concerning climate change, and efforts to create a multi-polar world order which serves the interests of all of these nations, including India.

From time to time, India has been very explicit that any arrangement with the United States of America is not oriented towards any third nation, notably China. This is something that India has been making very clear. Over the last several decades, India and China have made significant attempts to improve their relationship in the 21st century, particularly “under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping. \$84.4 billion was reached in bilateral trade between India and China in 2017. China is India's second biggest trading partner, behind only the United States of America.” While India takes great care to manage its ties with China, recent events, such as the DOKLAM incident in February 2017 and the CPEC project that would travel across Pakistani-controlled territory, have placed a strain



on the delicate nature of India-China relations. China's proximity to Pakistan is another aspect “that has played a significant role” in the overall ties between India and China. India has significant concerns with “China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” initiative as well as the completion of the "Road Silk Route" and the "Maritime Silk Route," both of which will travel through the Indian Ocean Region. In addition to its close ties with Pakistan, India is increasingly aware of China's growing sway on several of its more remote neighbors, including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Nepal. It is also necessary for China to accept the ever-increasing influence that India has both in the region and globally. Both must cooperate to bring about the multi-polar global system we need. China is not in a position to force other states into retaining Asia as a unipolar region totally under its control by preventing Asia from becoming multi-polar. Many nations that makeup ASEAN are already challenging the organization's strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

Incorporating significant elements of realism and pragmatism into India's external relations has, in essence, been the driving force behind the broad outlines of Indian foreign policy in the 21st century. India is putting in a lot of effort to ensure that it can maintain its strategic autonomy in forming its national interest on the regional and global levels. Development as a philosophical framework has been preserved. India is now the world's fourth-biggest economy, with a GDP of around \$3 trillion. It is the economy with the second-fastest growth rate on the global level. It is clear how important India's foreign policy has become under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi over the past four and a half years, as evidenced by the fact that Prime Minister Modi himself has traveled to more than 54 countries in the last 4.5 years, following the formation of the government in 2014. Since 2000 and onwards, Indo-American relations have entered a golden period, the likes of which have never been witnessed before in the seven decades during which they have had a bilateral connection. At the international level, India has gained a lot in terms of preparing itself for the possibility of taking on bigger responsibilities due to the United States offer of a strategic relationship. India has recently discovered a newfound confidence in various spheres, including its military, climate, economics, and many other sectors; as a result, there are no significant international crises that can be resolved without the involvement of India at this time. Even though relations “between the United States of America” and China and India and China are now considered normal, “the United States of America and India” both see China as a worldwide competitor. Cooperation between India and China is required if the aspirations of a multi-polar world are to be realized. Both parties need to work together to reduce the arms race that is taking place on the continent and ensure collaboration to achieve meaningful arms control and disarmament objectives to make the world a more peaceful place to live. It is imperative that all major responsible nations, including “the United States of America, China, Russia, India, and the European Union,” work together to make every effort to forestall the possibility of a "New Cold War" occurring shortly.

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