



INDO –PAK RELATION: KASHMIR AS A FACTOR

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Abstract

The Geo-Strategic location of the Jammu and Kashmir state made it most vulnerable state with whole of South Asian Region of the conflict situation at the tri juncture of euro Asia since times immemorial it did not diminish but due to the division of the sub continent its impact and influence emerged more because two Nuclear Asiatic giants are located in its north –India and south west Pakistan. The modern history of Jammu and Kashmir in its present boundaries was founded by Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846, through the treaty of Amritsar on the 16 March 1846. This Treaty was Kashmir was sold Gulab Singh by cash Payment of 75 Lac of Ruppess. Some Treaty recognised Gulab Singh as Maharaja Of the Jammu and Kashmir state. The Treaty of Amritsar proved an instrument of imperialism as well as a sale deed of Land with its Population. In Order to render the Defence and Security to the Huge Colonial empire of the Britishers from the greedy Eyes of French and Russia Expansionism to the Indian Sub-Continent as well as as Chains Extrusion's to the very Strategic areas from were various Military Adventurous had come and occupy the areas Like Bulgisthan, Giligit and whole of the area including the Valley up to the Binihal Pass. That is how we can make a reference regarding came to Mughal, Afghan's and lately by Sikhs of Punjab who Conquered the territories and Ruled centuries Together in the over the whole of area including the valley. This is here the Geo-Politics and Geography of the Jammu and Kashmir State provided an instance of its importance when it is located to Trijuncture of the state.

Key words: *Geo-Politics, Gulab Singh South Asian Region, Gulab Singh, Treaty of Amritsar, Defence and Security, euro Asia etc*

Introduction

The Geo-Strategic location of the Jammu and Kashmir state made it most vulnerable state with whole of South Asian Region of the conflict situation at the trijuncture of euro Asia since times immemorial it did not diminish but due to the division of the sub continent its impact and influence emerged more because two Nuclear Asiatic giants are located in its north –India and south west Pakistan. Since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, this unresolved land problem has been at the root of constant tension between the world's most populous democracy India and its neighbour Pakistan. That three major wars have been fought between those protagonists over the years only heightened the tension and fear that now exists new dangerous in there advanced technology. Global and regional implications aside the instability and lack of any conclusive resolution to the political dispute have left the population of Jammu and Kashmir divided and uncertain about their future. A land of immense beauty Kashmir has seen its once burgeoning tourist industry faded completely in the face of military incursions and terrorist activity. For over six decades, bilateral relations between Pakistan and India have been shadowed by the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan's official stance on the issue has not wavered:

Every relation between two or more states India and Pakistan weather cordial or strained is determined by different factors and every relation goes through its ups and downs. Some relations are developing as modern times. In the case of India and Pakistan the relations dates back to each other's very existence. Therefore every countries relation towards other countries is governed by their own national interests. While the relations with there the perspectives of economy some for strategic reasons some ideological and cultural identity. Among the inter countries relation economic and strategic relations predominantly capture the top interest in international relations. In conducting their relations every state is not free from suspicion and distrust between them. India and Pakistan is no exception to it. These are many Factors and reasons for having not having a timely good relation between the two. However, there history is no different up to 1947 as how the sub-Continent was partitioned and after the Partition their relations veered around certain Factors which made them poles apart and not to talks of good neighbouring.

Kashmir Problem Socio-Economic and cultural reason's besides the bloc politics effected the relations which became more complex since Soviet Occupation Afghisthan then USA Occupation of Afghanistan besides the raising military in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and various West Asian Countries. The modern history of Jammu and Kashmir in its present boundaries was founded by Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846, through the treaty of Amritsar on the 16 March 1846. This Treaty was Kashmir was sold Gulab Singh by cash Payment of 75 Lac of Ruppess. Some Treaty recognised Gulab Singh as Maharaja Of the Jammu and Kashmir state. The Treaty of Amritsar proved an instrument of imperialism as well as a sale deed of Land with its Population. In Order to render the Defence and Security to the Huge Colonial empire of the Britishers from the greedy Eyes of French and Russia Expansionism to the Indian Sub-Continent as well as as Chains Extrusion's to the very Strategic areas from were various Military Adventurous had come and occupy the areas Like Bulgisthan, Giligit and whole of



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On 14th of August 1947, the dominion of Pakistan was created on 15th of August; the dominion of India was created. Maharaja Hari Singh Offered a stand-still Agreement to the two Dominions as a prelude to his independence. Pakistan accepted the stand-Still Agreement offered by the Ruler of The state. The Governor of India However, refused to accept the stand-Still Agreement and instead asked to ruler of the state to depute a properly accredited representative of the state to discuss the implication of the Stand-Still Agreement with the government of India.

During the night of 21st October 1947, large groups of armed civilians supported by regular troops of Pakistan invaded the state. In a single swoop, the invading forces entered the district of Muzafferabad, Poonch and Mirpur. In Poonch and Mirpur the infiltrators had already destroyed all resistance and the invading armies quickly occupied the two district. The Invading forces now moved to enter the Jammu district but due to the difficult terrain and rugged mountainous Country, their advance was slowed down. The Pakistan troops did not attempt to cross the boarders of Jammu district for the fear of arousing retaliation from India. In Jammu city, rumours were set afloat that the city would be attacked by the troops from Pakistan at an opportunity time. The Muslim population was instructed to keep themselves in readiness to help the "Liberating Forces" once they were in the city. Actually The Muslim in Jammu quietly awaited the entry of Pakistani soldiers. In the Kashmir province, the invaders took the Jhelum valley road, which connected Srinagar with Rawalpindi and began their advance towards Srinagar. As they advanced they fanned all over the District of Muzaffarabad to liquidate the Dogra Defence. All Hindu and Sikhs Who fell into their hands, were killed. On 22nd of October 1947, Brigadier Rajendra Singh, the chief of Army of the state Forces, picked up about two hundred Dogra Soldiers From the same grass ion of about Four Hundred troops which had been retained in the Cantonment at Srinagar, to defend the city against the invading forces. The Brigadier pushed down the Jhelum valley road in a bid to meet the raiders on way, and stop their advance. Rajendra Singh Found himself Face to Face with thousand of regular militiamen and armed irregulars from Pakistan. He Fell back, and in his retreat blew up a strategic bridge at Uri. The invading Forces built a diversion and on 23rd of October, Recommended their advance towards Srinagar.

On 23rd 1947, The Muzafferbad and other a rounding areas declared themselves as Liberated it is how Azad Kashmir became under the Pakistan-Occupation and they found themselves as separate entity under the Pakistan administration. On 24th Oct Maharaja Hari Singh wrote to Indian Government for help to thwart to the invasion and advancing Pak-raiders but the Indian Government declined to help him. Conditionally and the same evening he left with bag and baggage introducing the state treasures. On 25th Oct 1947, Mrs Menno the home minsters of India reached to Jammu and had a talk with Maharaja Hari Singh. While returning to Delhi he met Sradar Patel and then to Nehru .Sheikh Abdullah was in Delhi. It is here the accession deed commenced and on 26th of Oct 1947, and 27th Oct Indian Army reached to Srinagar. The Indian Government, for no reason and out of Sheer despondency, took two days to come to a decision to accept the accession of the state and send troops to save the state from the rapidly advancing columns of invaders. The instrument of accession, made out by the Rulers of the state, was accepted by the Governor-General on 27th of Oct 1947. In a communication addressed to Maharaja Hari Singh, the Governor General of India informed him that the Government of India had to decide to seek the opinion of the people of Kashmir on the issue of the Accession of the State to India, after the raiders had been pushed out. On 6th November 1947, the invading troops mounted a server offensive on the Indian position at shalteng a Few miles away from Srinagar. The Indian troops held to their positions and as Pakistan attack petered out, the Indian troops attacked the Pakistani Position. The invading troops fell back. The Indian troops maintained their pressure, routed the enemy and forced it to withdraw to Baramulla. The main offensive of the invaders had been broken. Later the Pakistani troops were pushed out the district of Barmullah. Apart of the district of Muzzafarabad and Poonch were also cleared of the invading Forces. The war of resistance continued till IST of January 1949. The Fighting continue for whole of the month Nov-Dec. There had been few resolution passed for to resort to cease fire in the battle field had not been respected. Ultimately India took the dispute to the united Nation Security Council 1947, and Security Council annulled the Kashmir problem in its context from 1st of January 1948, it was as late resistance continue till 1st January 1949, a cease fire was affected with the help of united nation mediation as a result. The state was divided between India and Pakistan as Pak-occupied Kashmir and India -occupied ladkah Kashmir and Jammu through accession.

The conflict between India and Pakistan is easy to describe, but painfully difficult to understand "Enduring Conflict" Ugly Stability these terms, often used by scholars of International relation to capsule the relationship, are sadly, more often than not, "Occidental" attempts at forcing an eastern intellectual Puzzle into a preconceived Western mould. Unfortunately, The



India-Pakistan relationship is, and has been about almost every thing that matters history, Memory, prejudice, territory, identity, religion, Sovereignty, Ideology, insecurity, trust, betrayal, and much, much more, in a very Desi way. Pakistan evokes passion like few other countries, especially in northern India anger and nostalgia, hatred and Sympathy, contempt and fear combine to produce intensity of emotions that are difficult to reduce to a well defined analytical Category. Traditionally, the security community in India has been overwhelmingly in support of a policy of aggressively countering Pakistan. They believe that neither military defeat, nor constructive engagement, nor unilateral gestures, nor passive disregarded and not even international pressure seem to be able to reduce the pathological hostility that the Pakistan state bears towards India. In The event, according to subscribers of this view. Pakistan-instead of seeking to project itself as a responsible nuclear power-sought to use the cover of nuclear weapons to escalate the conflicts in Kashmir, buying the Lahore process under the heights of Kargil. Similarly, The Agra summit failed preliminary-in this view-because Pakistan was unwilling to concede that no normalization of relation is possible as long as Islamabad continues with its policy of sponsoring violence and terror across the boarder. It is believed that India had been willing to concede at Agra much more than it had done during the last decade, including setting up of a high level bilateral groups to discuss Kashmir and only Kashmir. But There has always been a small section of Indian opinion that believes that New-Delhi-more than ever before-has a stake in the future of Pakistan. A few years ago, Prime Minister Vajpayee unambiguously stated that Pakistan stability was also in India's national interest and this is echoed by the sufis. It was **Pervez Hoodbhoy** "Pakistan state is a already Fractured by multiple violent ethnic and religious conflicts. Disintegration into molecular Civil war with Fieldoms and warlords is a terrible possibility India will find too late, that it has created a South Asia nuclear Somalia for a Neighbour"

The Change in Pakistan

In the Course of a television interview in 2006 with the Indian Journalist president Pervez Musharraf abandoned decades of the most sacredly held mantras of Pakistan Kashmir Policy; Plebiscite and the united Nation Security Council Resolutions. During The course of the conversation, the general even ruled out supporting an independent Kashmir. The First major policy shift in Pakistan Kashmir Policy came when in December 2003, during the interview with Returns. Mush raff offered to set aside Islamabad 50s years old demand to implement UN resolution on Kashmir. It is clear that there is greater convergence today between the positions of Prime Minister Monamohan Singh and the President Musharraf on Kashmir than there has been between any two leaders of India and Pakistan in the late forty years this change has visible since their First Summit meeting in New Delhi in 2005. Both have ruled out a change of borders to be made irrelevant in order to territories, and Free Flow of People, good, service, ideas across the line of control. The reality however is that even by the most diabolic understanding of president Mush raff, India needs to engage with Pakistan and its leader's views on Kashmir in its own national interest. The Fact is that for Indians, the trust deficit in Pakistan beings. As was illustrated in the last few pages right at the top section of public opinion. Aided of course, by a cynical establishments cannot bring themselves to believe that President Mushaaraf could really want an accommodation with India. Why should someone who witnessed the horrors of Partition want to be friends with us? Understanding the mind of Parvez Mushraffa, probably the most agile and complex of recent Pakistani leaders require an ability that goes beyond backgrounders and pre-conceived notions of Muslims, Pakistanis and Generals. The reality, However, is that people do change; all the time as a matter of Fact. We tend to often judge military leaders by the absolute standards of robots, not as mere human mortals who can think and act differently if circumstances Change. President Mush araff has as well all know, done many U-turns in the past especially 9/11. The Musharraf at Agra, Who chided Indian editors at breakfast, is not the Mush raff of the television interview. But is Mush raff now willing to do the mother of all U-Turns change forever Pakistan Policy on Kashmir. The proof as, they saw is in the eating or perhaps just in tasting the recipe engage Musharaaf play with his ideas. Suggest Alternatives, but do not reject his proposal because of his past obnoxiousness. In any Case, It is India interests to be seen as dialoguing with the Musharraf proposals for a variety of reasons. Let us be clear only the most straitjacketed can argue that President Musharraf recent proposals do not demonstrate Flexibility whether or not this new shift demonstrates a fresh willingness to compromise and make peace with india. or is merely to ploy to gain entry in Kashmir needs to be carefully studied. Considered, however the response from the Kashmir valley almost every major political force. From mainstream to separatist from the national conference of Farooq Abdullah to Mufti sayeed's Peoples Democratic Party to the all parties Hurriyat Conference, has welcomed the Proposals. Indeed the only Group in the valley to outright reject the Pakistan Leader ideas is ironically, the pro-Pakistani hard-line Jamaat-I-Islamic Leader ,Ali Shah Geelani if at least in part, New Delhi Kashmir policy is to win the hearts and minds of the Kashmir people. Then it is important not to reject outright the flexibility inherent in the Mushraaff Ideas. Similarly, because the Pakistan President Proposals seem reasonable they are being taken seriously internationally and precisely for this reason, it is vital to constructively engage with them. But Beyond these tactical domestic and international considerations is the possibility that Mr Musharraf may have actually changed. The only way to find out if this indeed is the case is by dealing with him. There are several reasons why Pakistan may well be changing fundamentally and this change can generate maximum acceleration if it can met with an Indian policy of reconciliation. The first proportion that can be gleaned from the above analysis is that the region is moving towards greater stability, lasting peace and increased prosperity. Secondly, the force of economic



development and globalization are more likely to determine the contours of geo-politics in the region in the days to come than ethnic violence, inter-state rivalries and moribund geo-political game. It is evident that for once the geo-strategic context of indo-pak relation has changed in favour of an amicable solution to their long-pending problems. In other words, the present milieu is not one that would tolerate promotion of terrorism is the SAARC. As a result, states are likely to abstain from supporting conclusion. Considering that Pakistan internal problems and politics have always had their impact on Kashmir and India, let us assume that if Pakistan has to struggle to confront a twin problems. It will invariably have an impact on India. What will Pakistan do Vis-à-vis India and Kashmir and when the twin problem it faces becomes too difficult to contain. There are two possibilities, First; it will up the ante in Kashmir. In other words, we will see an increase in Pak-sponsored militancy in Kashmir in order to divert the attention of the media, the international community and the domestic audience so that it can crush the rebellion in Waziristan and Baluchistan and bring the situation back under control. The Post-tsunami relief efforts by India in the neighbouring countries, and the increasing demand by Sri Lanka requesting India to involve itself in the peace process in that country, along with the role that the international community thinks should play in the affairs of the region. Show the increasing pre-eminence of the country. With the view that Waziristan is an Islamic fundamentalist movement, it is a nationalist movement that we are witnessing in Baluchistan. However, Afghanistan is likely to be a wild card in this scenario of peace and tranquillity for the region. The US –Pakistan design in Afghanistan have the potential to disrupt the ongoing process of peace and reconciliation in that Country. While Pakistan wants to maintain its lost strategic leverage in Afghanistan, the US today is only concerned about an exit route from the afghan Challenge. However, the emerging situation in Afghanistan does not have the potential to disrupt the region as a whole, let alone disrupt the ongoing indo-Pak peace process. The April 2005 summit meeting between India's Prime Minister Monmohan Singh and Pakistan President Musharraf Seemed to open up fresh Political space, the terror of the New York encounter between the two, later in September 2005, seemed to have relapsed into the old crusty testiness and contentiousness. It is instructive to note how much strategic and political space was wrested by India in relation to Pakistan in the wider context, not so much as a result of the Vajpayee-led regime own diplomatic initiatives which, in any case, after the kargil episode had been placed on the backburner, But because of the sudden revulsion worldwide against Terrorism. if the Vajpayee initial eagerness to make history reflected in the visit to Lahore and the unveiling to the Lahore Declaration in February `1999. After the Mushraff coup and Kargil those inclination had long been buried. The First tentative step to break the ice with the new military leader Of Pakistan, General Musharraf-The Agra –Summit of July 2001 ended as is well known in Failure as F as Fundamental difference between two sides over cross-border terrorism and Kashmir stalled the launching of a fresh declaration. While Pakistan's relations with India should certainly evolve and to some extent are already going beyond a narrow Kashmir-centric approach, stronger economic links would not only strengthen existing and create new constituencies for peace in both countries but also open opportunities for a meaningful dialogue on longstanding disputes, including Kashmir. But after September 11, and the global against "Islamic terrorist" got underway the leader of the NDA regime Pakistan would be identified as a source of Islamic terrorist and Mushraff would soon face international isolation. They clear did not anticipate that Mushraff would make his own pragmatic leap towards strategic cooperation with the united state. The relationship with Pakistan plunged to new and abysmal depths after the terrorist attack on the Srinagar Legislative Assembly in October 2001, to be followed by the deadly suicide attack on Parliament House in New Delhi that December after which snapped all ties with Pakistan. One such road block India policy, begging with its refusal to accept the consistent and constituting anti-policy begging. With its refusal to accept the constitutionally validated and democratically endorsed accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India as is well know India and Pakistan through the year to restart the confidence-building process which included restoration of rail, road, and Air links, the appointment of fresh high commissioners on either side taking care to express of sporting links, including cricket, with both sides taking care to express periodically their reservations. India and Pakistan finally agreed to a formal ceasefire along the international border (IB), the line of Control (Loc) and the actual ground position line (AGPL) In Jammu and Kashmir. We've pursued one policy armed conflict. It has failed Now we have to try the soft approach – softer borders, fewer visa restrictions, deeper commercial ties", emphasising, "when the economic stakes rise on both sides, even a solution on Kashmir would be much easier" The B.J.P Government exclaimed it as over 9/11. India banned all trade and social exchanges with Pakistan and suspended over flight right of Pakistani commercial planes Pakistan also took similar action according to new situation both countries deployed nearly more than a million-strong force along border. In January, 2002 at a SAARC summit in Kathmandu, President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf once gain play with Pakistan's dignity and clear stand on Kashmir sayings them freedom fighters in Kashmir. This and many other actions were seen open acrimony and hostility that further infuriated the leaders of India. However when Indian parliament attacks occurred the Indian home minister L.K Advani who was against Musharraf`s regime and took the ball in the court of Pakistan and told them Indian expectations but totally failed to increase Washington's pressure on Pakistan in the regard. Bush Administration showed empathy in this regards India but refused to condemn Musharraf in this regard all issue and apprehensions through comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan the conflict between India and Pakistan for control over Kashmir has had a direct bearing on the issue of terrorism, both regionally and internationally. It became evident that Pakistan had to "find new allies to fight the asymmetric warfare against India" Subsequently, in the 1990s, a new trend of



external insurgency began in the Kashmir, apparently with the tacit support of the Pakistani Intelligence Agency (ISI), after the end of the Cold War. The insurgent groups like, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and Lakshar-e-Taiba (LET), which were earlier members of the Afghan Mujahedeen group.

The following steps should be considered as a way to move the normalisation process forward:

1. Both sides should appoint high-level special envoys to lead the talks -- trusted emissaries of the leaderships. Appointing envoys avoids the pitfalls of moving straight to summit meetings, as in the past, while reducing the influence of bureaucrats who have tended to be reluctant to move on many normalisation issues;
2. The agenda agreed upon in February 2004 is based on previous discussions and includes the widest array of issues. It represents a welcome first step but it must be sustained, regardless of immediate results. A longer, slower process is more likely to be productive than the stop/go talks of the past. Both sides should stay with the full timetable of talks regardless of any provocations by extremists who might try to derail them. They should, moreover, opt for closed-door meetings, without press conferences, in order to lower expectations and reduce the over-heated media attention that is likely to surround such talks;
3. India should reconsider its public opposition to international facilitation of the talks. There are several precedents for international involvement. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 was sponsored by the World Bank, which is the treaty's guarantor. The Soviet Union facilitated the talks that led to the Tashkent Agreement in January 1966. India has in the past few years relied on U.S. engagement in its disputes with Pakistan, for example, to apply pressure on Islamabad to disengage in Kargil and later to withdraw support for cross border incursions. More recently, the U.S. was pivotal in bringing the governments back to the negotiating table, successfully persuading Prime Minister Vajpayee to resume dialogue with Pakistan. The reality is that the U.S. is now a regional power with direct military involvement in South Asia and powerful interests not just in acting as a fire-fighter during crises but as an active participant in the development of peace. Including it openly would mostly be recognition of a reality that already exists but would nevertheless be helpful in moving the process forward;
4. SAARC's potential to assist dialogue between India and Pakistan must be utilised more effectively. The charter of the regional body excludes bilateral and contentious issues but it can serve as a forum to promote cooperation in areas such as trade, thus assisting the normalisation process by building and strengthening domestic constituencies for peace; and
5. There is need for CBMs that actually work. Too many have been little more than formalities. The establishment and implementation of the timetable for talks is itself useful. Restoration of air, bus and train links has been welcome and will help build confidence between the two countries. Similar opportunities in other areas

The current direction of policy toward Pakistan will likely remain unchanged if the BJP wins the next election – unless, as discussed below, another terror attack brings an abrupt halt. , the Indian and Pakistani premiers met for the first time in two and a half years. They have promised further talks. There is also going to be expansion of, track II diplomacy, confidence building measures and transportation and communication links between the two countries. In reciprocation, India has withdrawn some of its troops from the valley. All these steps promise a great deal of potential for a resolution to the issue. However, no concrete steps directly dealing with the problem have been undertaken, and until such steps become visible progress will be impossible.

Conclusion

Since the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947, the Kashmir dispute between them has become intractable one. They fought three wars over it in 1947, 1965, 1999, but have not resolved it. The India and Pakistan like Israeli's and Palestinians make claims to the same territory. Instead of the peace and progress which the both countries expected. Although there is no immediate and direct correlation between bilateral trade and the Kashmir dispute, deeper economic ties would help repair the breach between Pakistan and India. Potentially a roadmap for a far broader relationship between the two countries lies in the current composite dialogue. The challenge is for Islamabad and New Delhi to build on what has been achieved. The democratic transition in Pakistan is fragile, with the military still exercising a veto over key policy areas, including Kashmir, India and external security. It is more likely that the high command will impede than support the normalization process. As a political economist argued, the military "has always resisted such moves in the past, so it is too early to say if they will not do so this time". Yet, the civilian leadership has taken some significant steps forward even when confronted by military resistance, particularly on MFN. If the democratic transition continues, and as elected civilian governments find their footing and are more able to dictate foreign policy preferences, there will be new prospects to move beyond a rigid, Kashmir centric approach to India – regardless of which party forms the government after the next election, since the main contenders, the PPP and PML-N, support broader bilateral ties and regional peace. Given Pakistan's significant economic challenges, enhanced economic ties would also encourage the more comprehensive economic reforms



needed at home to produce a better climate for bilateral trade and investment. To allow this, Pakistan and India will have to overcome the deep mistrust that has impeded cooperation between their governments and hampered interaction and engagement between two peoples that could form the bonds necessary for both economic vitality and a sustainable peace.

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